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Medvedev’s Presidency – implications for NATO’s future relations with 
Russia. 
 
Since the famous characterization of what Winston Churchill, maybe 
mischievously, termed ‘Russia’, as ‘a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an 
enigma’, nearly sixty nine years have passed; that just sixty nine years would 
prove to be exactly the life span of the USSR, I think that we can agree, would 
have come as a surprise to the British statesman in 1939, as indeed it did to 
so many of us just over half a century later. In discussing the implications of 
Medvedev’s presidency for NATO’s future relations with Russia, I will take, as 
a starting point, an admittedly controversial judgment that the Soviet Union 
was brought down, not, as many in the West would maintain, by President 
Reagan, NATO intransigency and Star Wars, nor even by perestroika or 
‘democratization’, but by Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost, the very openness 
that Vladimir Putin appeared bent on eradicating between 2000 and 2008 as 
he moved Russia back along more traditional authoritarian lines in order to 
overcome the widespread chaos and insecurity of the 1990’s.  I would argue 
further that it is disingenuous to ignore the fact that the overwhelming majority 
of Russians today connect openness – which we in the West see as the very 
life-blood of our civic, democratic and free societies – as a major cause of 
unprecedented national humiliation, enfeeblement and instability.  On the 
contrary, it is my firm belief that these differing perceptions of openness 
should be factored into any formulation of an effective NATO policy toward its 
former long-standing adversary. 
 
Churchill’s key to the ‘Russian’ riddle was its ‘national interest’. Now in 2008, 
academics, diplomats, journalists, military specialists and politicians are 
engaged in an intense debate over the implications of what is arguably the 
first voluntary handover of supreme executive power in more than a thousand 
years of Russian history by an apparently healthy and relatively young leader 
to his chosen successor.  As Putin formally vacates the presidency for his 
protégé Dmitri Medvedev, textbooks on the almost forgotten art of 
‘Kremlinology’ are being dusted down, consulted and updated in an attempt to 
discover in which direction is Russia now likely to head and what will the 
implications be for relations with the West in general and NATO in particular.  
 
My contribution before you today seeks to revisit this riddle by using 
appropriate analytical tools to look deeper into Russia’s national interest and 
examine what I perceive to be the dilemma lurking therein. At the same time I 
will look at a parallel dilemma facing NATO in formulating its own interests vis-
à-vis Russia in the short, medium and long term.  I have identified these 
dilemmas, to which I will return in more detail later, as, on the Russian side, 
national interest perceived as either great power status (as envisaged in 
Putin’s 2020 strategy paper) or a modern, democratic ‘European’ state (as 
advocated by Russian ‘democrats’ and human rights activists).  Let me put my 
cards on the table from the outset and declare that I am with the ‘democrats’ 
on this, although I am only too aware that this view is by no means shared by 
the Russian population as a whole, let alone Putin or Medvedev, and that 
even were this desirable outcome to materialize, as we shall see, problems 
would still remain. 
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On NATO’s side, there is the fall-out stemming from the characterization of 
both the war in Iraq and the ‘war on terror’ as battles between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. 
This has damaged significantly the Western concept of ‘democracy’ within, but 
especially outside, the alliance.   Coupled with this is a perceptible and 
growing recognition that a Western-style parliamentary democracy may well 
be (as Medvedev has already articulated in public pronouncements since 
being elected) inconsistent with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of 
Russia as it is presently constituted. This dichotomy leads to a situation in 
which pressure from NATO that appears to push Russia down the road to 
‘democracy’ will be perceived in the Kremlin as a threat not only to its security, 
but to its very existence.  In other words, the continued promotion of 
democracy by NATO in the former Soviet Union will inevitably clash with the 
current perceived priorities of the Kremlin.  My argument is that such clashes 
need not and should not automatically lead to conflict. 
 
Rather than retread the well-worn path of the chequered history of NATO-
Russian relations I propose to share with you today conclusions drawn from 
my more than forty years of close engagement, on both a personal and 
professional level, with first the Soviet Union and then Russia in an attempt to 
view these relations from a Russian perspective filtered through the prism of 
the mind of a citizen of the West (and, insofar as I was just three when the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded, I suppose that one could say, 
a child of NATO). 
 
I do this not in any way to justify the actions and policies of, or plead special 
treatment for, Russia, let alone to criticize, preach to or lecture those of you 
here who are charged with the delicate and demanding task of handling 
relations with NATO’s eastern neighbour. What I seek to offer you is an 
understanding of these genuine dilemmas facing both Russia and NATO so 
that, at the very least, relations are not unintentionally and needlessly 
exacerbated. At best, I hope that elements of what is in danger of becoming 
evermore a zero-sum game can be transformed into an empathetic 
recognition of the mutual interests and intentions of both sides, upon which 
reasoned and understandable policies may be based.  Why is this needed at 
the present juncture?  Because, in my judgment, NATO and Russia stand 
currently at the entrance of an impasse into which neither side wishes to enter 
but into which both are in danger of being inexorably drawn due to mutual 
distrust, misperceptions and unresolved dilemmas.   
 
For example, let us accept both NATO’s repeated assertion that its expansion 
eastwards represents no threat to Russia and the realistic assessment that 
Russia no longer poses any immediate military danger to the ‘old’ members of 
the North Atlantic alliance.  This would be all well and good were it not for the 
fact that the very countries in Eastern Europe that are most anxious to seek 
shelter behind NATO’s shield (be it missile or otherwise) DO perceive a real, 
present or potential, threat from a resurgent Russia seeking to reassert itself 
in its ‘near abroad’; thus recreating from the Baltics to the Balkans and from 
the Caucasus to Crimea a classical security dilemma from the days of the 
Cold War.  Small wonder, therefore, that NATO retains, for Russian leaders 
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and led alike, ‘the worst image of all influential international organizations’.  
Widespread popular condemnation of US/NATO actions in Kosovo, Iraq and 
over missile defence has led to a vision of the West from Russia that is 
markedly different from how we would wish to be viewed. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, as recently as August 2007, 56% of Russians polled identified 
NATO as ‘a hostile bloc’, whereas at about the same time the European Union 
(which appears to present economic opportunities rather than threats to the 
Russians) was viewed favorably by nearly two-thirds of the same population.   
 
It seems to me that to attempt to assuage such strongly-held expressions of 
popular distrust by promising the furthering of ‘democracy’ in a country where 
the adjective ‘Western’ in the 1990’s was soon replaced in everyday discourse 
by ‘cursed’ in relation to democracy (for the reasons above), is self-evidently a 
sterile strategy in need of urgent re-examination if unnecessary conflict is to 
be avoided. In other words, the cognitive consonance produced in our own 
societies by such concepts as ‘democracy’ (and, in certain contexts, NATO) 
currently produces a corresponding cognitive dissonance in Russia.  Of 
course, this is not to suggest that we should forego either democracy or 
NATO just in order to appease Russia. Rather that both, to be effective, 
should be configured, and presented, in such a way as to increase the 
perceived advantages for, and decrease the perceived threats to, not only the 
Russian president and people but also, I would argue, the populations of 
present and prospective members of the organization.  For, as was revealed 
at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April this year, not only was there clear 
evidence of a lack of unanimity over NATO expansion, but there were signs 
also that the public in NATO member countries appeared to be confused and 
surprised by the ease and haste with which new members were accepted. 
  
Perhaps, in retrospect, an opportunity was lost in the 1990’s when, with the 
eradication of the Soviet military threat, the refocusing of NATO to the 
promotion and defence of democratic values was not accompanied by a 
change of name.  This could have opened the way to eventual membership, 
should Russia have elected to persevere with the far from easy transition from 
authoritarian regime to democratic rule in the wake of such Western countries 
as Portugal and Spain and those of Central and Eastern Europe, such as the 
Czech Republic, Poland and the Baltic states.  Instead, the rhetoric about 
‘sovereign’ democracy emanating from the Kremlin notwithstanding, I think 
that we can agree that Putin has sought stability through less openness and 
more authoritarianism. 
 
Whatever the division of powers between Putin and Medvedev, it is quite clear 
in the short term that there is little prospect of Russia remaining anything other 
than, at best, a semi-authoritarian regime with a single dominant party 
controlled by a single vertical of executive power.  Although such regimes may 
provide stability in the short term they tend not to be as stable (in the face, for 
example, of a dramatic downturn in the economy due to a sharp fall in oil 
prices, major natural disasters etc.) as either one-party states or democracies.  
What they share with the former is a marked resistance to policies that might 
lead them to cross the threshold of democracy by allowing truly competitive 
elections. The relatively recent experience of the then maverick Yeltsin’s 
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electoral victories over ‘approved’ communist party candidates in 1989 and 
1990 serves as a stark warning of the unintended and unforeseen 
consequences that might flow from such a move. Hence the dichotomy of 
views on Russia’s future direction between the current leadership and a 
considerable majority of its population on the one hand, which favours 
maintaining the territorial integrity of the Russian state as a Eurasian entity 
and the much smaller minority which sees Russian national interest best 
served by shedding the non-Russian territories acquired in the period of 
Tsarist and Soviet expansion and creating a smaller, modern European-style 
democratic nation-state.  
 
Russia’s dilemmas do not end there.  Two-thirds of its territory (and much of 
its present and projected energy resources and mineral wealth) is located in 
Asia where not only is the population miniscule compared with those of its 
Asian neighbours, but also much of the territory is on land claimed, albeit 
nominally, by indigenous non-Russian ethnicities.  To exacerbate matters, 
resurgent Russian nationalists from the extreme south-west to the far north-
east, while appearing to regard the territories, for example, of Chechnya and 
Chukhotka, with their riches in oil and gold respectively, as belonging to 
Russia, tend to treat the Chechens and Chukhchi as second-class citizens, at 
times as unwanted aliens.  The trauma of 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war on 
terror’ notwithstanding, one has to note that tragically, the passivity and 
silence emanating from Western governmental institutions, including NATO, 
over the manifestly brutal treatment of the Chechens by the Russians during 
the 1994-6 and 1999-2006 conflicts hardly leaves much moral high ground 
from which the West might criticize Russia on its handling of ethnic minority 
issues. It inadvertently sends a message to the Russian authorities that 
intervention is undertaken not on issues of principle, but only when it suits the 
West’s narrower interests. The lesson that both the Russian people and its 
leaders, unfortunately but understandably, have drawn from the Iraq war is 
that the United States (and by extension NATO) is prepared to launch 
massive attacks against weak states with much-needed resources, and is 
best deterred by a strategy of powerful military defence and multipolarity 
(hence the importance paid by the Kremlin to the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization).   
 
Clearly, it is not in the West’s strategic interests (nor, as critics as diverse as 
Michael McFaul and Boris Nemtsov have indicated, in the economic interests 
of the Russian people) to actively facilitate any prolongation of a highly 
corrupt, clan-controlled political system in Russia, with its potentially 
dangerous nexus of crime, violence and the circumvention of the rule of law.  
An optimist might perceive Putin’s choice of Medvedev, rather than a fellow 
silovik (from the military and security ministries), as his successor as an 
indication that the realization has dawned on the upper echelons of the 
Russian power elite that the greed and tenacity of such officials, reluctant to 
lose their source of seemingly unlimited riches and influence, stand in the way 
of the much-needed modernization of the Russian economy.  As a younger 
man with little or no experience of working in the military/security or even 
communist party milieu and with a broader background in legal affairs and 
business than his predecessor, one can confidently predict that Medvedev, at 
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least, has the potential to be a force for change if he is given the freedom so 
to do.  Whether even he would opt, or be allowed, to cross the line from 
centralized, authoritarian rule to democratic governance is much more 
doubtful in the short term.  It is these difficult choices facing the world’s largest 
country that create in turn dilemmas for NATO in its future relations with 
Russia. 
 
The first dilemma for NATO might be whether a less corrupt, less than 
democratic, but predictable and stable Medvedev-style regime would be 
preferable to a situation in which Russia’s abundant resources might fall into 
the hands of criminal or even terrorist elements or, indeed, China.  The 
second dilemma concerns the identification of the optimum strategy for NATO 
expansion.  Clearly, there is a danger in unnecessarily fast-tracking Georgia’s 
and Ukraine’s applications for membership to NATO. The Medvedev/Putin 
‘tandem’ could well respond by pre-emptive interference in Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, East Ukraine and Crimea.  On the other hand, Russia must be given 
a clear and unambiguous signal that it has no veto on the democratic 
aspirations of these peoples and states. The effectiveness of such a signal, 
however, rests upon two assumptions: 1) that the admission of Georgia and 
Ukraine is presented as genuinely pro-openness and not anti-Russian; and 2) 
that there is unanimity between NATO members (and their populations) that 
the Georgian and Ukrainian people and governments are indeed ready and 
willing to make the full transition to open and democratic societies. For if 
overstretch can cause such problems in terms of popular support for 
governments within the European Union, it is unlikely that these self-same 
governments would be immune from widespread domestic criticism were 
NATO expansion to proceed at a faster pace than was considered as 
objectively necessary. 
 
So where would such realpolitik leave the Russian supporters of a democratic 
nation state?  If NATO and the West were to stand idly by, then the answer is 
clear; they would be in great danger of sharing the fate of the late Anna 
Politkovskaya and like-minded activists.  Russia has voluntarily signed up as a 
member of European forums such as the Council of Europe and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; both committed to the 
observance of civil liberties and good governance.  If Russia is allowed to 
breach the rules of these organizations with impunity, as in the 
aforementioned case of Chechnya, and if it can divide and thus rule influential 
member countries of these organizations by exercising its soft ‘energy’ power, 
then it is unlikely to heed warnings that it is not acceptable for contract killers 
or agents of the state to execute at home and abroad business competitors, 
dissidents, investigative reporters or political opponents without being held to 
account for such actions by the broader international community.  However, 
these rules and guiding principles should not be held up as ‘ours’, but as 
‘civilization’s’ and  those countries that are best-placed to observe them, 
including NATO members, must be seen to do so to avoid the charges of 
double standards and hypocrisy.  I cannot be alone in detecting a potentially 
serious disconnect between those in civilian and military life who actively and 
ardently seek to uphold these principles and the oft times ‘super’ greed of the 




This brings me to my final point. We should not shy away from examining the 
damage done to the West’s reputation as the upholder of democratic 
principles wreaked by the war in Iraq, in particular, and the ‘war on terror’ in 
general. Despite its enormity, the damage is capable of repair. Having studied 
terrorism and counterterrorism practically from its first appearance almost forty 
years ago in July 1968, I would be among the last to deny the very real threat 
posed to democratic societies by terrorists.  NATO members must anticipate 
and expect further such attacks.  However, in my opinion, the threat has been 
blown out of all proportion.  In life, if one is to undertake any risky venture, be 
it trekking the Sahara or exploring the Amazon, one takes sensible and 
appropriate precautions and then gets on with the task in hand.  The 
overreaction to the threat purportedly posed by terrorism to the Western way 
of life, it seems to me at times, is like seeking to traverse the Amazon or the 
Sahara in a spacesuit within a sterilized bubble while armed to the teeth 
against every eventuality. Just what is the point of such an exercise? 
 
After all, the strength of Western societies vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes is 
that we are open, free, and accountable. We are willing and able to counter 
might with right for all members of society, even those who consider 
themselves wealthy or powerful enough to avoid the responsibility. It seems  
indicative that the election for the next president of the United States is 
contested by a person of mixed race, a woman, and a former prisoner of war; 
a call for a return to some basic principles after the follies of unilateralism if 
ever I heard one.  To my mind, the abandonment of the very principles that 
have served the cause of freedom and democracy so well within the NATO 
alliance since the last world war and the replacement of civic strength by the 
projection of mainly military power combined to produce a strategy that was 
always doomed to fail.  
  
Never has there been a more urgent need for the democratic alliance of 
nations to unite under the single banner, not of fighting a ‘war on terror’, but in 
standing up to brutality, exploitation, injustice and oppression wherever they 
occur.  That is what our citizens are good at; this is what they want to do. This 
is what those millions in countries deprived of these basic rights such as 
China, Russia and most of the developing world expect us to do on their 
behalf.  Not because it is ‘good’, nor even because it is ‘right’, but because it 
works! 
 
There is no stronger argument for the way of life that NATO seeks to uphold 
and protect than the demonstration effect on the rest of the world of a well-
functioning, caring, humane and just society, mature enough to embrace 
diversity and honest enough to admit its own faults before criticizing the 
behaviour of nations who are not in step with us.  Openness is infectious; 
North America and Western Europe have passed it on to Central and now 
Eastern Europe.  States that built upon an imperial past or ambition by 
cementing a form of bureaucratic capitalism such as Russia and China may 
hold back the flood tide while improving incrementally the lot of their peoples 
in the short term, perhaps even the medium term.  But in the long term the 
demonstration effect, if genuine and believable, will burst even these dams. Of 
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course, there might well be a very long wait indeed.  Although the temptation 
to hasten the process will at times be great, it is always likely to be 
counterproductive.   
 
Thus in conclusion, although it might appear at first glance that it is Russia 
that has to change its ways, it is my belief that this is best brought about by 
the West changing to better connect with the aspirations, beliefs and 
principles of its greatest single asset – its own, in the main, very decent 
citizens.  For its part, the Russian people has provided human civilization with 
some of its greatest cultural and scientific achievements, from Alexander 
Pushkin to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, from Dmitri Mendeleev to Sergei Korolov, 
often under conditions of great personal or national sacrifice.  What better way 
to repay that debt than by allowing the Russian people, in their time and their 
way, to begin to enjoy the fruits of a humane just and strong civic society, 
arguably the single greatest contribution that the West has made to humanity? 
 
Much has been made of the link between Dmitri Medvedev’s surname and the 
Russian word for ‘bear’, the traditional symbol in the West for the Russian 
nation.  Many before me have pointed out that Russia, like the bear, will tend 
to go just as far as you let it, but, when faced with resistance stiff and 
determined enough, will tend to back off.  I commenced this address with 
reference to Winston Churchill, so it is appropriate, perhaps, to remind 
ourselves in this city, above all others, that we are shortly to mark the sixtieth 
anniversary of the beginning of the Berlin Airlift, one of the most glorious 
pages of the Western alliance’s contribution to freedom and democracy and 
one of the prime motivators for the foundation of NATO.  So clear and 
unambiguous was the message delivered on that occasion, that even as 
undemocratic a dictator as Stalin was left in no doubt as to the West’s resolve 
not to back down. Compared to the grizzly Caucasian brown bear that was 
Stalin, the leather-jacketed, Led Zeppelin-loving Medvedev might seem more 
like Winnie-the-Pooh, but appearances can be deceptive.  The new Russian 
president, like his predecessor, is from the hero city of Leningrad, the siege of 
which formed one of the most glorious, albeit tragic, pages of Russian history. 
Medvedev will need similar clarity and lack of ambiguity from this side in our 
relations with him in differentiating NATO resolve in defending agreed 
principles from policies perceived as being directed simply at weakening 
Russia. Only then can the NATO-Russian relationship become one of 
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